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This paper investigates the inter-temporal loss usage of tax units in Ger-
many. Tax units that experience a loss in a year can oﬀset that loss with
positive income from adjacent year to receive a tax refund. Similar to compa-
nies, tax units can employ losses as carry-back in the year before the loss or
as carry-forward in the year following the loss. The tax code does not force
a particular loss usage but provides tax units with freedom to allocate the
losses between carry-back and carry-forward. Choosing an individual appro-
priate allocation of carry-back and carry-forward creates a maximal tax refund.
Inter-temporal loss usage is a special case of tax avoidance: tax units receive
a tax refund from loss usage as carry-forward (carry-back) but forfeit the al-
ternative refund from carry-back (carry-forward). Estimations show that the
probability of maximizing the tax refund highly depends on the diﬀerence of
the tax rates from the loss adjacent years. An increase of 10 percentage points
of the tax rate diﬀerence increases the probability of tax refund maximization
by 24.5%. This conﬁrms that tax avoidance is strong in case of signiﬁcant tax
incentives.
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1 Introduction
The usage of losses is widely recognized as a tax planning tool to reduce tax bur-
den.1 The German income tax code provides substantial insurance against negative
incomes in two ways: (1) negative incomes from one income source can be oﬀset
against positive incomes from other income sources from the same year. (2) if the
negative incomes exceed positive incomes from the same year, those negative in-
comes, hence called losses, can be oﬀset against positive incomes from the adjacent
years. Incomes from renting and leasing are a prominent example of loss oﬀsetting
within a year in Germany and recent results suggest a negative correlation between
total income and income from renting and leasing.2 Losses from business income
are the main source for inter-temporal loss usage, which plays a considerable role in
the federal German budget and reduces the tax revenue 1.2% annually.3 Tax units
are free to chose the allocation4 of the losses as a carry-back to the year before the
loss or as a carry-forward to the year following the loss in the income and tax decla-
ration.5 This paper calculates if tax units use a tax refund maximizing allocation of
losses and estimates what drives that maximizing allocation. Using micro-simulation
methods show that only 59% of tax units choose an allocation that maximizes their
tax refund from losses, which are hence called refund maximizer. The share of the
refund maximizer increases between 8% to 15% when tax units are allowed to have
small deviations from the tax refund maximizing loss allocation.
The recent release of administrative micro panel-data from 2001 to 2006 on income
tax returns, supplied by the German Federal Statistical Oﬃce, opens new possibil-
ities to investigate the inter-temporal loss usage. During that period, the biggest
German tax reform in recent history was implemented. The reform lowered tax
rates between 2003 and 2005 in two steps and increased incentives to use losses as
1See for instance Bach et al. (2009) who disregard losses from renting and leasing exceeding
5000 Euros for the calculation of individual economic income.
2See Müller (2006) for more details on the size and distribution of losses from renting and
leasing.
3See Bach and Buslei (2009) for an extensive depiction of the inﬂuence of losses on the tax
budget.
4There is a limit on the carry-back for a single tax unit of 500,000 Euros. Carry-forwards are
unrestricted until 1,000,000 Euros, and losses exceeding that amount can be still used with 60%.
Unused losses can be only carry-forwarded but do not expire and must be used once income in the
subsequent years is positive.
5Tax units are able to delay their income declaration to the end of the following year when the
tax unit has knowledge of the incomes from both adjacent years. The declaration asks the tax unit
whether she wants to restrict the amount of carry-back and if so by how much. If a tax unit does
not report anything, losses will be carried back.
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carry-backs.6
Literature on losses can be divided into two branches, individual loss usage and
companies loss usage. A milestone in the literature on company losses is the paper by
Auerbach and Poterba (1987). Their results suggest that companies losses play a key
role for proﬁt strategy and in tax planning. Dwenger (2008) shows for Germany how
potential restrictions on inter-temporal loss usage of companies could substantially
increase tax revenue.7
So far, there is only little empirical evidence on the individual loss usage for Germany.
Müller (2006) describes contemporary loss oﬀsetting between 1989 and 2001 with
ﬁve cross sections of tax income returns. He ﬁnds a negative correlation between
total income and the two main loss sources, income from renting and leasing, and
business income. While more than 40% of the aggregated losses from renting and
leasing are held by the 10% richest tax units, about 70% of the business losses
are obtained by the lowest 10% of the income distribution.8 Another example by
Bach and Buslei (2009) relies on microsimulation for assessing the impact of losses
on eﬀective tax rates on income sources. They compute eﬀective tax rates with
and without loss usage and ﬁnd that eﬀective tax rates signiﬁcantly increase for
most types of incomes when losses are included. Moreover, they show how the loss
oﬀsetting regulations decrease tax revenue by 1.2% annually. Lang et. al (1997)
ﬁnd that tax revenue in 1983 is reduced by 33.6% of total tax revenue due to legal
and illegal tax avoidance. Estimated eﬀective marginal and average tax rates are as
much as sixteen percentage points lower than legislated tax rates and mainly come
from tax avoidance through under-reporting of interest income and deductions from
real estate.9
Inter-temporal loss usage possesses integral features of tax avoidance that allows to
complement Lang et al.'s (2013) results: loss usage creates a tax refund in the used
year, but costs a reduced tax refund from loss usage in alternative years. This is in
line with Slemrod's (2001) model of tax avoidance which derives tax avoidance as a
6The tax rate in the year the loss is used determines the tax refund. Assuming income from
adjacent years being equal and a tax reform lowering tax rates in future years, one would expect
tax units to use more losses as carry-back to maximize tax refund.
7While only a small share of companies would be aﬀected from the restriction, tax revenue
would increase over 1 billion Euros.
8Wegener (2014) conﬁrms that the two main individual loss sources are renting and leasing,
and business income, and ﬁnds that the majority of losses are contemporary oﬀset with positive
incomes. This is especially true for losses from renting and leasing where 96% of all losses are
contemporary oﬀsets. About 84% of losses from business income are contemporary oﬀset.
9Bach et al. (2013) remark that those numbers are based on survey data that do not include
the richest two percent of German tax units, and do not allow to draw conclusions about taxation
of the top.
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function of the income tax and avoidance costs. Slemrod (1995, 2001) shows that
tax avoidance is individually optimal when marginal costs of avoidance equal its
individual beneﬁt. Furthermore, inter-temporal loss usage contains features of tax
avoidance such as tax planning, renaming or re-timing activities aiming to reduce
tax liability.
This chapter contributes to the literature on tax avoidance and individual loss usage
with a special case of tax avoidance for Germany. To the best of my knowledge, it
is the ﬁrst paper to measure tax avoidance in the special context of inter-temporal
loss usage. Incentives for tax avoidance depend on the individual income and the
associated tax refund. The particular inter-temporal loss oﬀset feature of the Ger-
man income tax code can be used to maximize the inter-temporal tax refund by
choosing the right allocation of carry-back and carry-forward.
Applying the popular Probit model shows that tax refund maximization highly de-
pends on the diﬀerence between the tax rates from the loss adjacent years. A tax
rate diﬀerence of 10 percentage points between the years prior to the loss and subse-
quent to the loss increases the probability of refund maximization by 24.5 percentage
points.10 This is in line with the result from Alstadsaeter and Jacob (2012) who ﬁnd
that tax incentives have a particular high impact on tax avoidance.11 The results
for the tax rate diﬀerence are robust against the inclusion of control variables for
incomes and losses. Somewhat surprising are results that tax consultants do not
have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the probability of refund maximization. By contrast,
the size of the loss can have an impact on the probability of refund maximization.12
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 4.2 describes the German tax system,
recent tax reforms and the mechanics of loss usage. Section 4.3 presents some
descriptive results and Section 4.4 shows regression results and section 4.5 concludes.
10Using 10 percentage points is a conservative number for the tax rate diﬀerence. Tax units
with losses in a year have high income variance and accordingly high tax rate variance. Tax refund
maximizer have a high mean of tax rate diﬀerence with 20.6 percentage points.
11Alstadsaeter and Jacob (2012) classify tax avoidance into three categories: incentive, access
and awareness. Using a regression discontinuity design to investigate income shifting from personal
income to corporation income induced by the Swedish capital taxation reform 2006, the authors
ﬁnd that tax minimization activities increase signiﬁcantly with increasing tax rates and awareness
of the tax code.
12Losses increase the probability of tax refund maximizing in the benchmark speciﬁcation but
reduce the probability in alternative speciﬁcations.
3
2 The German Income Tax System and Reforms
The German income tax schedule is progressive, taxable income above the basic al-
lowance is divided into three brackets with increasing marginal tax rates within the
two lower brackets and a constant marginal tax rate in the top bracket. Moreover,
it discriminates substantially between single and married tax units.13
Further, the German tax code allows tax units to delay their income declaration
until the end of the subsequent year. Thus, tax units are able to know their taxable
incomes from the years surrounding a loss before they have to choose a loss allo-
cation.14 The German Income Tax code allows several tax reliefs on total income
reducing the basis for the taxable income. Losses from other years need to be used
primarily before other reliefs can be employed. However, only if total income is neg-
ative, tax units can use their negative income as a loss in other years. A negative
taxable income or a taxable income below the basic allowance is not suﬃcient to
claim inter-temporal loss usage.15 Once tax units declare a loss, they can either use
the loss as a carry-back in the year prior to the loss, or as carry-forward in the year(s)
after the loss. The income declaration asks to limit the amount of carry-back. If the
tax unit does not choose an amount, the loss will be carried back until total income
from the prior year is either zero or the losses are all carried back. Losses which are
not used as carry-back need to be used as carry-forward once the total income from
the subsequent year is positive.16 Unfortunately, the data do not allow to use losses
from earlier years than 2004 due to other reforms on the loss oﬀset law.17
Marginal tax rates from the loss adjacent years determine the tax refund from the
loss usage. The most prominent income tax reform in recent German history had
an impact on marginal tax rates and was passed in 2000. The reform consisted of
13Married taxpayers can opt for the splitting tax schedule to decrease their joint taxation and
marginal tax rates. Marginal tax rates for married couples are determined as if one single taxpayer
would earn the average taxpayers income. Accordingly, the tax burden is calculated as twice as
much the single taxpayer with the average income would have to pay.
14The data deliver detailed information on the usage of losses. I.e. it is possible to identify
the amount of carry-back and carry-forward. Furthermore, it is possible to determine the income
source with the loss.
15Note that other tax reliefs lose their tax saving potential, once used losses reduce total income
below the basic allowance in the employed year.
16However, there are restrictions on the maximum amount of loss usage. Carry-back cannot
exceed 500,000 Euros (1,000,000 Euros) for single (married) tax units. Carry-forward is unrestricted
until 1,000,000 Euro (2,000,000 Euro) for single (married) tax units, and restricted to 60% for losses
exceeding 1,000,000 Euro (2,000,000 Euro). Remaining losses can be used in the following years.
17The usage of losses between 2001 and 2003 was primarily restricted to usage within income
sources. A complex deduction system also allowed to oﬀset a limited amount of high losses with
positive incomes from other sources. However, the data is not providing conclusive identiﬁcation
to connect losses and their usage in other years.
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a gradual reduction of the personal income tax schedule, accompanied by modest
tax base broadening and combined several steps which lowered the whole income
tax schedule from 2003 to 2004 and from 2004 to 2005.18 Figure 1 demonstrates the
eﬀect of the reform on marginal tax rates for an individually taxed tax unit.
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Note that the tax reform decreased the tax refund from carry-forward and increased
incentives for loss usage as carry-back. Equation (1) illustrates an example of in-
centives for loss usage for the ﬁrst loss Euro. ∆τ is the diﬀerence of tax refund
when the loss is used as a carry-back or as a carry-forward. τt−1(Zt−1) (τt+1(Zt−1))
denotes the marginal tax rate from the year prior to (following) the loss and Zt−1
(Zt+1) is taxable income from the year prior to (following) the loss.
∆τ = |τt−1(Zt−1)− τt+1(Zt+1)| (1)
The refund is maximized when losses are used in the year with the higher marginal
tax rate. Thus, tax units that are not able to increase their tax refund from a
reallocation of loss usage can be deﬁned as tax refund maximizer.19 Maximizing
the tax refund from a considerable loss implies that the marginal tax rates from the
18Besides the reduction of all marginal tax rates, the basic tax allowance was slightly increased
from 7,206 Euro in 2003 to 7,664 Euro in 2005.
19Alternatively, one can allow tax units to diﬀer from this strict deﬁnition of tax refund. One
alternative deﬁnition allows tax units to deviate with up to 200 Euros from their maximal tax
refund, another deﬁnition allows tax units to deviate up to 5% of losses weighted by average
income. In addition another deﬁnition tax units can deviate up to 2% of the potential maximum
of tax refund.
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adjacent years are equal after loss usage.20 Thus maximizing the tax refund from
losses underlies the same optimization process than tax avoidance does: individual
tax avoidance is maximal when marginal avoidance costs equal the marginal tax
saving. To avoid an endogeneity problem when estimating the probability of tax
refund maximization, only the tax rate diﬀerence of the ﬁrst loss Euro is used in the
further analysis.21
3 Descriptive Results
This section displays some descriptive results of German tax units with losses. Start-
ing with simple descriptive results, the section continues with an analysis of the
distribution of refund maximizers and the distribution of deviating losses from the
refund maximizing allocation. Subsequently, the section shows at which positions
of the income distribution tax units with losses are, and ﬁnishes with more detailed
descriptive statistics.
Simple descriptive results are presented in Table 1. The Table contains the tax rate
diﬀerence ∆τ for tax refund maximizer and for non-maximizer, the loss and the
adjacent incomes Zt−1 and Zt+1. Table 1 shows that ∆τ is 58% higher for refund
maximizer than for non-maximizer. Losses and incomes Zt−1 and Zt+1 are high
on average with very high variation. Moreover the mean-median ratio shows that
incomes and losses are highly skewed with mean-median ratios exceeding 3. The
size of the individual maximal tax refund is a combination of the loss and the cor-
responding tax rates from the adjacent years. Accordingly, one would expect that
incentives to maximize the refund show positive correlation with increasing adja-
cent incomes and with increasing size of the loss. Further, one would expect that
the probability of refund maximization particularly correlates with a combination
of losses and adjacent income: the loss income ratio.
20This is true unless the refund is maximized by using losses only in one year. That could be in
the case of a small loss or comparable high income in one year and comparable low income in the
other year.
21In the case that the tax refund is maximal through loss usage with both carry-forward and
carry-back, the tax rate diﬀerences for the last Euro is zero.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for selected variables
Mean Median Mean- Std. N. Obs.
Median Ratio
∆τ , RM .208 .207 1.005 .13 5227
∆τ , NRM .132 .084 1.57 .12 3604
Losses -111871 -16388 6.83 479753 8831
Zt−1 126940 33909 3.74 550264 8831
Zt+1 136334 28984 4.70 560245 8831
Notes: RM denotes tax units that maximize the tax refund, NRM denotes tax units that
do not maximize the tax refund. Zt−1 denotes the total income from the year prior to
the loss, Zt+1 denotes total income from the year subsequent to the loss, N. Obs. is the
number of observations with losses from either 2004 or 2005 with incomes in the adjacent
years exceeding the basic allowance.
Source: Own computation based on German Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006.
Figure 2 illustrates shares of tax units that maximize their tax refund. Tax units
are sorted into 20 equally sized groups and average shares of refund maximizer are
computed for every group. The long dashed line presents the groups average shares
sorted by increasing income from adjacent years, the dashed line presents the groups
average shares sorted by the increasing ratio of losses to income from adjacent years,
using that loss income ratio as an indicator for the relevance of the losses to the tax
units. The solid line is the overall average share of tax refund maximizer with 59%.
The ﬁgure displays that there is no clear pattern for refund maximization with either
increasing income or increasing loss income ratio. Shares of refund maximizer diﬀer
only little per group from the overall mean. Only the lowest two groups of the
income sorted tax units have substantially higher refund maximization rates and
only the lowest group of the losses weighted by income has a substantially lower
rate of maximization rate.22 The message of Figure 2, though, is limited to the
correlation between shares of tax refund maximizer and two variables: income and
the loss income ratio. However, the ﬁgure is not able to reveal the magnitude of the
deviations from the refund maximizing loss allocations.
22Sorting tax units by losses looks very similar to the sorting by income.
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Figure 2: Distribution of shares of refund maximizer
To complement Figure 2, Figure 3 depicts how much tax units deviate from the
refund maximizing loss allocation. Average shares of deviating losses are computed
and ordered into 20 equally sized groups and sorted by adjacent income (solid line)
or the losses income ratio (dotted line). Sorting tax units according to income shows
a very robust share of deviating losses for all 20 groups. Sorting according to the
loss income ratio however, highlights a strong decline for deviating loss from an
increasing ratio.23
23Appendix (7.2) shows very similar results for further tax refunds weighted by the losses in
Figure 5.
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Figure 3: Share of deviating losses
Figure 2 and Figure 3 provide three insights. (1) Adjacent income neither drives
the probability of refund maximization nor deviating losses from the refund maxi-
mizing loss allocation. (2) The loss income ratio does not drive the probability of
refund maximization but shows strong correlation to the deviating losses. (3) With
increasing loss income ratio, i.e. relevance of losses to the tax units, deviating losses
from refund maximization decrease.
Figure 4 shows that inter-temporal loss usage is not concentrated on one section
of the income distribution and matters to the whole income distribution. However,
the size of the losses along the distribution increase exponentially with the income
decile.24 The solid blue line in Figure 4 is the relative share of all tax units with
losses in the decile. The dotted red line is the average loss in a decile divided by
overall average loss.25 Figure 2 shows that the majority of tax units with losses
are located in the second and third decile. Losses below the sixth decile are small
24The position in the income distribution is deﬁned on the average income in all years but the
year of the loss and expressed with 10 deciles.
25The average loss is the mean loss of all tax units with losses.
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compared to the average loss, but increase exponentially with the deciles. Losses
are highest in the top decile and about 23 times higher than the average loss.
Figure 4: Distribution of losses
Table 2 continues with descriptive results that is better able to show incentives for
the loss usage as carry-forward or carry-back. Even if the tax reform, depicted in
Figure 1 lowered the tax refund from carry-forward for losses from 2004 or 2005, a
refund from carry-forward could still be higher than from carry-back, depending on
the tax units income distribution. Table 2 illustrates incentives for particular loss
usage by sorting tax units with diﬀerent income distributions into diﬀerent groups.
The left panel shows descriptive results for tax units with higher income in the
year prior to the loss than following the loss (Zt−1>Zt+1), the right panel shows
descriptive results for tax units with higher incomes in the year following the loss
(Zt−1<Zt+1). In both panels are tax units separated into refund maximizing (RM)
and non-maximizing (NRM) observations. Table 2 conﬁrms for both panels that
refund maximizing tax units have higher averages of tax rate diﬀerences than non-
maximizing tax units. There are two further points about the descriptive results for
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the tax rate diﬀerences worth noting. First, the gap between the tax rate diﬀerences
between refund maximizing and non-maximizing is particularly huge in the right
panel with higher income in the following year. Second, due to the tax reform that
lowered tax rates in years following the loss, tax units that do not maximize the tax
refund would have a 17.4 percentage points higher tax refund from using the ﬁrst
loss Euro as carry-back than from carry-forward.
Table 2: Mean and standard deviation sorted after adjacent incomes
Zt−1>Zt+1 Zt−1<Zt+1
NRM RM NRM RM
∆τ .174 .22 .072 .197




.518 .20 .389 .398
(.41) (.38) (.40) (.37)
Forward
Losses
.618 .077 .549 .781
(.42) (.20) (.44) (.34)
Forward
Used Losses
.884 .128 .676 .900




.065 .291 .147 .082
(.20) (.29) (.28) (.23)
Back
Losses
.113 .810 .316 .09
(.31) (.34) (.45) (.26)
Back
Used Losses
.116 .872 .324 .10
(.32) (.27) (.46) (.27 )
Number of Observation 2136 2515 1468 2712
Notes: RM denotes tax units that maximize the tax refund, NRM denotes tax
units that do not maximize the tax refund. Zt−1 is total income from the year
prior to the loss, Zt+1 income from the year following the loss. Observations are
taxpayers with losses from either 2004 or 2005 and with incomes exceeding the
basic allowance in the adjacent years.
Source: Own computation based on German Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006.
Table 2 also displays the distribution of loss usage in greater detail. Three ratios
show diﬀerent aspects of loss usage: the ﬁrst ratio compares carry-forward (carry-
back) to income of the following year (income of the prior year), the second carry-
forward (carry-back) to the total losses and the third carry-forward (carry-back) to
all used losses.26
The three measures conﬁrm that non-maximizing tax units do not use their losses ac-
cording to their income and tax rate distribution. The sub-group of non-maximizing
26Total losses can exceed the used losses if total losses are bigger than the adjacent income.
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tax units with higher incomes in the year prior to the loss, use only 12% of carry-
back of their used losses while using 62% of total losses as carry-forward. Those tax
units use excessive carry-forward even when the refund from carry-back would be
higher.27 This is particularly interesting since the German income tax code would
automatically assign losses as carry-back if not chosen diﬀerently by the tax unit.
Also, carry-backs oﬀer other potential advantages: the tax refund is one year earlier
than a refund from the subsequent year and higher tax rates in the year prior to
the loss oﬀer higher tax refunds. In contrast, tax refund maximizing tax units with
higher income in the year prior to the loss use 87% of their used losses as carry-
back and only 8% of total losses as carry-forward. Non-maximizing loss users in the
right panel have a low average of tax rate diﬀerence and use excessive carry-back.
However, diﬀerences between refund maximizing and non-maximizing tax units are
not as striking for tax units with higher incomes in the year following the loss.
Refund maximizing tax units use 90% of their losses as carry-forward, while non-
maximizing tax units only 68%. However note that diﬀerences between groups are
not statistically signiﬁcant in this descriptive analysis.
4 Regression Analysis
This section presents results from the regression analysis. Section 4.1 starts with
results from the Probit model in Table 3. Results are based on a strong criterion for
tax refund maximization: every tax unit that could have an increased tax refund
from an alternative loss allocation is denoted as non-maximizing. A sensitivity
analysis, relaxing this strong requirement on refund maximization is presented in in
Table 4.
All results from Table 3 and Table 4 are drawn from a selective sub-sample with tax
units that face a decision of their loss usage between carry-back and carry-forward.28
This induces a potential selection problem and section 4.2 presents results in Table
5 based Probit model which controls for the selective nature of the data following
Heckman (1979).
27About 60% of all tax units use only carry-forward, 29% use only carry-back and only 11% use
both carry-back and carry-forward.
28Only tax units with income above the basic allowance in the years adjacent to the loss can
reduce tax burden in both years with the usage of carry-back or carry-forward.
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4.1 Probit model
The Probit model estimates the tax refund maximizing loss usage yi of tax unit i
equaling 1 if the tax unit maximizes the tax refund, and 0 if not. The model includes
a constant, the individual diﬀerence of the tax rates ∆τi and two types of control
variables Xi and Zi. ∆τi is allowed to have a non-linear relationship, measured by α1
and α2, Xi contains characteristics of the tax unit which could have an inﬂuence on
loss usage, measured by column vector β1 and Zi includes the adjacent incomes and
the absolute value of the loss in logs, measured by column vector β2.
29 To control for
the inﬂuence of the variables contained in Zi, regressions are also performed using
only a subset of the controls of Zi. ui is the error term and is assumed to follow
the standard normal distribution.30 Since tax units can ﬁle the income report at
the end of the year following the loss, I assume that all incomes from loss adjacent
years and the loss are exogenous to usage of the loss.31
yi = c+ α1∆τi + α2(∆τi)
2 + β′1Xi + β
′
2Zi + ui (2)
Column I of Table 3 shows marginal eﬀects for the Probit model of equation(2) with-
out controls for adjacent income and loss. The tax rate diﬀerence has a signiﬁcant,
high and concave eﬀect on the likelihood of tax refund maximization. Higher tax
rate diﬀerences have a strong impact on the probability of tax refund maximization.
A tax rate diﬀerence of 10 percentage points increases the probability of tax refund
maximization by 20.8 percentage points. Most of the control variables including the
tax consultant dummy are insigniﬁcant, which is surprising.32
Tax units with higher incomes are likely to have a higher variation in income, and
be able to proﬁt from experience with tax minimizing strategies.
29Table A.4 in the appendix describes the control variables in greater detail.
30To check that assumption, results for the Logit model, assuming a standard logistic error
distribution and the linear probability model, assuming a uniform distribution, are presented in
the appendix.
31This is equivalent to assuming that tax units do not produce a loss in a year on purpose.
32The data provide information about expenses for conducting the income report. Tax units
that exceed a lower threshold of expenses are assumed to have a tax consultant. However, results
are robust against any probability level.
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Table 3: Probit model with diﬀerent speciﬁcation
I II III IV
∆τ 2.378*** 2.382*** 2.426*** 2.459***
(0.122) (0.123) (0.126) (0.126)
∆τ2 -3.033*** -3.045*** -2.448*** -2.509***









D tax consultant 0.015 0.011 0.010 0.007
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
D business -0.037* -0.030* -0.028 -0.023
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
D business, high 0.038** 0.021 0.010 0.007
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
D rent 0.009 0.008 0.013 0.010
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
D rent, high 0.005 -0.006 -0.008 -0.013
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
D year -0.022* -0.023* -0.021* -0.021
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
D prior losses -0.045*** -0.046*** -0.059*** -0.057***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Pseudo-R2 .090 .091 .126 .128
Number of
Observations 8831 8831 8831 8831
Share of RM .592 .592 .592 .592
Notes: Regressions also include a constant, a marriage dummy and a dummy for
losses bigger than income from adjacent years. Asterisks denote the respective
signiﬁcance level at 95% (*), 99% (**), and 99.9% (***). ln(Zt−1) is the logarithm
of the total income from the year prior to the loss, ln(Zt+1) is accordingly the
income from the year following the loss. Share of RM is the relative share of
refund maximizing tax units.
Source: Own computation based on German Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006.
Also, tax units with higher losses might substantially diﬀer from tax units with
lower losses but could have the same tax rate diﬀerence. For instance, they could
have more resources at their disposal to plan their income declaration, have higher
education or experience the loss with a diﬀerent background.
To control for inﬂuence of potential heterogeneity between tax units with the same
tax rate diﬀerence, results in column III and IV include the losses and column II
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and IV include the adjacent incomes. Adding the losses in column II has no eﬀect
on the coeﬃcients of the tax rate diﬀerences. However, the probability of tax refund
maximization increases with increasing losses, also with a concave eﬀect.
Including incomes from the adjacent years in column III leaves the marginal eﬀects
of the tax rates virtually unchanged. The marginal eﬀect of income from the year
before the loss is negative, the marginal eﬀect from income from the year following
the loss is positive. This is connected to the tendency of a large group of tax units
to use losses preferably in the following than the prior year.
Adding both the incomes and losses in column IV does not aﬀect the tax rate dif-
ference signiﬁcantly, but slightly increases its eﬀect. Now, a 10 percentage point tax
rate diﬀerence increases the probability of tax refund maximization by 22 percentage
points.
First robustness checks are performed in Table 4 which presents a variation in the
criterion of of tax refund maximization. Column I is a reproduction of column IV
of Table 3 and is based on the strong refund maximization criterion.
To control for this strong requirement of refund maximization, three alternative def-
initions are applied and compared to the benchmark results from column I. Results
in column II are produced based on the ﬁrst alternative refund maximization deﬁni-
tion: tax units can deviate up to 200 Euros of tax refund from the strong criterion.
This criteria does not penalize minor deviations from strict refund maximization.33
This increases the share of refund maximizing tax units by 7.6 percentage points.
The second alternative in column III allows tax units to deviate up to 5% of the
loss income ratio. This is my preferred speciﬁcation because it allows relative small
deviations from the strong criterion and redeﬁnes only tax units with their majored
of losses used for refund maximization.
This is my preferred speciﬁcation because it allows relative small deviations from
the strong criterion and redeﬁnes only tax units that use their majority of losses for
refund maximization.34 Compared to the benchmark, the share of refund maximizer
increases by 11.5 percentage points. Column IV shows results based on the third
alternative: tax units can deviate up to 2% of the potential maximum of tax refund,
which increases the share by 14.8 percentage points to 74%.
33Note that this criteria changes the sorting of the tax units asymmetrically and is likely to
redeﬁne non-maximizing tax units with small losses more often into the refund maximization
category than tax units with bigger losses.
34Noe, that this alternative does not assign tax units with small losses automatically to the tax
refund maximizing category.
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Table 4: Probit for diﬀerent criteria of refund maximization
I II III IV
No 200 Euro Loss Tax-Refund
Deviation Deviation weighted weighted
allowed Deviation(5%) Deviation(2%)
∆τ 2.459*** 2.155*** 1.801*** 1.633***
0.126 0.120 0.120 0.115
∆τ2 -2.509*** -2.525*** -1.436*** -1.509***
0.294 0.278 0.284 0.269
ln(Zt−1) -0.049*** -0.052*** -0.014** -0.023***
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
ln(Zt+1) 0.080*** 0.040*** 0.064*** 0.049***
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
ln(loss) 0.087*** -0.201*** -0.219*** -0.301***
0.016 0.020 0.021 0.023
ln(loss)2 -0.005*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.012***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
D tax consultant 0.007 0.005 0.012 0.014
0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009
D business -0.023 -0.038** -0.059*** -0.052***
0.015 0.015 0.014 0.014
D business, high 0.007 0.028* 0.042** 0.053***
0.014 0.013 0.013 0.013
D rent 0.010 0.011 0.002 0.004
0.015 0.014 0.014 0.013
D rent, high -0.013 0.007 0.003 0.013
0.015 0.014 0.014 0.013
D year -0.021* 0.003 0.007 0.011
0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009
D prior losses -0.057*** -0.048*** -0.029** -0.029**
0.012 0.011 0.011 0.010
Pseudo-R2 .128 .14 .128 .123
Number of
Observations 8831 8831 8831 8831
Share of RM .592 .668 .707 .740
Notes: Regressions also include a constant, a marriage dummy and a dummy for losses bigger than income
from adjacent years. Asterisks denote the respective signiﬁcance level at 95% (*), 99% (**), and 99.9% (***).
ln(Zt−1) is the logarithm of the total income from the year prior to the loss, ln(Zt+1) is accordingly the
income from the year following the loss. Share of RM is the relative share of refund maximizing tax units.
Source: Own computation based on German Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006.
A tax rate diﬀerence of 10 percentage points increases the likelihood of refund max-
imization by 19 percentage points in column II, by 16.6 percentage points in column
III and by 14.8 percentage points in column IV. However, while the marginal eﬀect
of the tax rate diﬀerence decreases, it remains signiﬁcant and has a high inﬂuence
on the likelihood of refund maximization.
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Results for the tax rate diﬀerence suggest that the increasing share of refund max-
imizer reduces the diﬀerences between the refund maximizer and the non refund
maximizing tax units. Changing the deﬁnition of refund maximization induces only
one noticeable diﬀerence for the control variables with the coeﬃcients for the loss.
The coeﬃcient changes from 0.09 in column I to -0.20 in column II and remains
that high and negative for the alternative speciﬁcations in column III and IV. This
indicates that tax units with smaller losses change disproportionally more from the
non-maximizing to the refund maximizing group. Moreover, this implies the sur-
prising result that following column II to IV, the higher the loss of the tax unit, the
lower the probability of refund maximization.
4.2 Probit model including a selection control
Results so far can be driven by a potential selection bias through non-random selec-
tion which would not allow to interpret the marginal eﬀects as causal eﬀects.35 To
control for the selection, results in Table 5 are based on the Probit model including
a Heckman (1978) selection control.36
Results in Table 5 are produced analogously to results in Table 4 with varying re-
fund maximization criteria. The selection parameter, the inverse Mills ratio λ is
signiﬁcant for all speciﬁcations with little variation between the optimality deﬁni-
tions and a mean of 0.1Again, most marginal eﬀects of the control variables are
not sensitive to the criterion of refund maximization. A 10 percentage point tax
rate diﬀerence in my favored speciﬁcation in column III increases the probability of
refund maximization by 24.5 percentage points. The eﬀect of the loss is negative
for all speciﬁcations but the benchmark criteria, with smaller marginal eﬀects (in
absolute value) in column II to IV. Results from these estimations conﬁrm that tax
incentives determine loss usage. High tax incentives increase the likelihood of refund
maximization, thus driving tax avoidance.
35Results from Table 3 and Table 4 are based on a heavy selective sample: only tax units
with losses and adjacent incomes exceeding the basic allowance have the necessary loss usage
circumstances.
36The exclusion restriction for the Heckit is the number of children, age of the tax units and
information about losses from earlier years.
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Table 5: Probit model including selection control for diﬀerent criteria of refund
maximization
I II III IV
No 200 Euro Loss Tax-Refund
Deviation Deviation weighted weighted
allowed Deviation(5%) Deviation(2%)
∆τ 3.100*** 2.930*** 2.800*** 2.617***
(0.201) (0.194) (0.192) (0.186)
∆τ2 -3.858*** -4.155*** -3.536*** -3.577***
(0.444) (0.426) (0.426) (0.410)
ln(Zt−1) -0.029*** -0.028*** 0.016* 0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
ln(Zt+1) 0.098*** 0.061*** 0.091*** 0.076***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
ln(loss) 0.173*** -0.105*** -0.098** -0.185***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
ln(loss)2 -0.010*** 0.004* 0.001 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
D tax consultant 0.003 0.000 0.006 0.008
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
D business -0.015 -0.029* -0.048** -0.041**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
D business, high -0.001 0.019 0.031* 0.042**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
D rent 0.015 0.017 0.010 0.012
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
D rent, high -0.018 0.001 -0.003 0.007
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
D year -0.036*** -0.015 -0.016 -0.012
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
D prior losses -0.084*** -0.081*** -0.072*** -0.070***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
λ 0.112*** 0.138*** 0.176*** 0.175***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026)
N1 8831 8831 8831 8831
N2 1849155 1849155 1849155 1849155
Share of RM .592 .668 .707 .740
Notes: Regressions also include a constant, a marriage dummy and a dummy for losses bigger than income
from adjacent years. Asterisks denote the respective signiﬁcance level at 95% (*), 99% (**), and 99.9% (***).
log(Zt−1) is the logarithm of the total income from the year prior to the loss, log(Zt+1) is accordingly the
income from the year following the loss. λ denotes the inverse Mills ratio from Heckmans sample selection
model. N1 is the number of observations used in the second stage of the model, N2 the number of observations
that are not included in the second stage of the model but in the ﬁrst stage of the Heckman model. Share of
RM is the relative share of refund maximizing tax units.
Source: Own computation based on German Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006.
Moreover, tax units with low tax rate diﬀerences do not use losses to maximize tax
refunds because incentives are not high enough.
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5 Conclusion
This paper uses a substantial insurance component of the German income tax code
to study opportunities of tax avoidance. German tax units with severe income
shocks who experience a loss in a year can oﬀset that loss with positive incomes
from adjacent years. Tax avoidance is maximized if the oﬀset losses are used ac-
cording to tax rates from the loss adjacent years.
The paper uses a unique German tax return panel data that comprise six straight
years, from 2001 to 2006, and three diﬀerent tax rate schedules. That data connects
exhaustive individual information about incomes, socio-demographic characteristics
and losses. Moreover, it allows to connect the losses from one year with its usage
in the surrounding years. Micro simulation provides tax rates and the computation
of the potential tax refund from the loss usage, and the computation of the refund
maximizing loss usage. The progressive German tax schedule and two steps of a
recent income tax reform provide strong exogenous variation of tax refund and pro-
mote to use losses in the year before the loss.
Results show that only about 59% of tax units maximize their tax refund. Non-
refund maximizing tax units belong mainly to two groups: tax units with low in-
crease of tax refund from an alternative loss allocation, or tax units that prefer
future tax refund over current tax refund.37 However, the share of 59% refund max-
imization is based on a strong criterion for tax refund maximization: the tax unit
needs to use all losses according the refund maximization loss allocation. Relaxing
that somewhat strong criterion by allowing minor deviations increases the share up
to 67% or 74% depending on the deviation concept.
To investigate determinants that drive tax refund maximization, this chapter further
employs the Probit model to estimate determinants of the probability of tax refund
maximization. The preferred model includes several socio-demographic control vari-
ables, incomes from loss adjacent years and the loss. Further, the model includes
the variable of interest, the tax rate diﬀerence from the loss adjacent years. That
variable illustrates the diﬀerence of the tax refund potential from the loss adjacent
years. Results from sensitivity analysis show that the marginal eﬀects of the tax
rate diﬀerence is robust against the inclusion of incomes from adjacent years and the
loss. Further, results imply that tax consultants have no signiﬁcant positive impact
on the probability of tax refund maximization. Main results are drawn from the
37That is particular interesting since the German income tax code would automatically assign
losses as carry-back if not chosen diﬀerently by the tax unit. Moreover, carry-backs oﬀer other
potential advantages: the tax refund is one year earlier than a refund from the subsequent year
and higher tax rates in the year prior to the loss oﬀer higher tax refunds.
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Probit model including a selection control following Heckman (1978). That selec-
tion control counteracts the selective nature of the estimation sample: only tax units
that experience an aggregated loss in one year and have incomes above the basic
allowance in the loss adjacent years have incentives for inter-temporal loss usage.
The ﬁrst requirement is an obvious necessity for studying inter-temporal loss usage,
the second requirement ensures that the tax units have incentives for loss usage in
both years and need to decide where to use it. In order to control for the selective
nature of the estimation sample and to interpret marginal eﬀects as partial eﬀects,
the Heckman model includes a selection control from a ﬁrst step estimation. Indeed
results from the Heckman model conﬁrm the necessity of the selection control.
Results from the preferred model are obtained for four diﬀerent deﬁnitions of tax
refund maximization. Most reasonable results are obtained from allowing minor de-
viations of 200 Euro from the strong criterion. Estimations suggest that a tax rate
diﬀerence of 10 percentage points increases the probability of tax refund maximiza-
tion by 24.5 percentage points.
That result is robust for alternative deﬁnitions of tax refund maximization includ-
ing relative deviations from the strong criterion. Estimation results from the strong
criterion however propose a stronger impact from the tax rate diﬀerence. A 10
percentage points tax rate diﬀerence increases then the probability of tax refund
maximization by 27.1 percentage points.
Results from this chapter suggest that tax avoidance is especially large when tax
incentives have a considerable size. Further, that tax incentives of small size are less
likely to induce tax units to maximize their tax refund and to exercise tax avoidance.
This result is in line with Lang et. al (1997) who ﬁnd that tax avoidance in Germany
increases with increasing tax rates and is of signiﬁcant size and conﬁrms theoreti-
cal results that tax avoidance is very responsive to taxation (Slemrod 1995, 2001).
Moreover, results imply that tax avoidance is non-constant, increases with tax rates
and is stronger than income reactions to taxation.38 Following Chetty (2009), this
provides further evidence that the elasticity of taxable income is inappropriate for
welfare analysis of income taxation.
38See Chapter 2 for estimations of the taxable income to tax rate changes.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Data and data processing39
Relevant information generated in the process of taxation is documented in the
income tax return: information on the family situation, declaration of income from
diﬀerent sources, granted deductions and exemptions, calculation of taxable income,
and personal income tax payment. The German Federal Statistical Oﬃce collects
the oﬃcial income tax returns electronically as Income Tax Statistics, providing
the basis for a balanced panel, the German Taxpayer Panel. Individual taxpayer's
IDs are used to link annual cross section income tax returns over time to create
the panel. However, this procedure might be problematic. In cases of marriage,
divorce or moving to another federal state, individual tax ID will be given up,
created new or changed. Additionally, German wage earners are not forced to ﬁle
a tax return unless they have other sources of income. Moreover, the incentive for
wage earners of ﬁling a tax return depends on the expectation of a possible tax
refund. The German Taxpayer Panel does not include tax returns which are only
available for a subset of years and not consistently linkable. It contains income tax
returns of approximately 19 million observations out of possible 31 million taxpayers
included in the Income Tax Statistics. Several socio-economic characteristics of
taxpayers such as age, number of children, church membership and marital status
are observable. Tax units with losses are very likely to ﬁle income reports since they
have a potential tax saving ability. Furthermore, tax units with atypical income
structure need to ﬁle a tax report anyway.
On basis of ﬁve stratiﬁcation criteria, i.e. federal state, assessment type, main type
of income, level of total income and variation of the total income, a 5% sample is
drawn and made available for scientiﬁc purposes. The stratiﬁcation procedure aims
to optimize the sample with regard to standard errors of total income over time.
Observation weights are generated accordingly. Tax units with high positive income
are highly over-sampled in our sample. However, losses of tax units are not over
sampled and I assume that they are only randomly drawn and are representative
for tax units with losses in Germany.
39The ﬁrst half of this section is taken from an earlier working paper with Nima Massarrat-
Mashhadi (see Massarrat-Mashhadi (2012)).
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7.2 Further Descriptive Statistics
Figure 5: Distribution of further tax refunds
Figure 5 is a reproduction of Figure 3 and shows the ratio of further tax refunds
to the size of the loss if tax units would have used all losses according to refund
maximizing. Average shares of the ratio are computed and ordered into 20 equally
sized groups and sorted by adjacent income (solid line) or the losses income ratio
(dotted line). The ratio can be understood as a weighted result of the deviating
losses: deviating losses are weighted by the individual tax rates and the loss. If tax
rates are diﬀerent along the sorting, the average shares of the refund ratio should
show a varying pattern. Sorting tax units according to income shows a robust share
of refund ratio for all 20 groups. Sorting according to the loss income ratio, however,
highlights a strong decline for refund ratio for increasing loss income ratio. These
patterns are very similar to the patterns in Figure 3 which suggests that further
refund follows a similar distribution to the deviating losses.
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7.3 Results from the Logit model
Results in Table A.1 and Table A.2 show marginal eﬀects from the Logit model for
diﬀerent criteria of redund maximization. Table A.1 shows results for the model
without the selection control from the two step Heckman approach, and Table A.2
including the selection control.
All in all, marginal eﬀects from the Logit model resemble the marginal eﬀects from
the Probit model remarkably well. The marginal eﬀects of the tax rate diﬀerence in
Table A.2 have the same size and are not statistically diﬀerent from the marginal
eﬀects from the Probit model in Table 4. Results in Table A.2 also resemble re-
sults from the Probit model in Table 5 remarkably well and are statistically not
distinguishable.
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Table A.1: Logit for diﬀerent criteria of refund maximization
I II III IV
No 200 Euro Loss Tax-Refund
Deviation Deviation weighted weighted
allowed Deviation(5%) Deviation(2%)
∆τ 2.442*** 2.133*** 1.775*** 1.627***
(0.126) (0.119) (0.120) (0.115)
∆τ2 -2.457*** -2.478*** -1.324*** -1.463***
(0.300) (0.281) (0.297) (0.277)
ln(Zt−1) -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.012** -0.020***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
ln(Zt+1) 0.082*** 0.040*** 0.064*** 0.048***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ln(loss) 0.089*** -0.204*** -0.223*** -0.308***
(0.016) (0.020) (0.022) (0.024)
ln(loss)2 -0.005*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
D tax consultant 0.007 0.005 0.011 0.014
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
D business -0.023 -0.038** -0.060*** -0.054***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
D business, high 0.008 0.027* 0.041** 0.051***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
D rent 0.010 0.011 0.001 0.003
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
D rent, high -0.013 0.006 0.003 0.013
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
D year -0.022* 0.002 0.006 0.010
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
D prior losses -0.056*** -0.047*** -0.028** -0.028**
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Pseudo-R2 .127 .139 .128 .122
Number of
Observations 8831 8831 8831 8831
Share of RM .592 .668 .707 .740
Notes: Regression includes a constant, a marriage dummy and a dummy for losses bigger than income from
adjacent years. Asterisks denote the respective signiﬁcance level at 95% (*), 99% (**), and 99.9% (***).
ln(Zt−1) is the logarithm of the total income from the year prior to the loss, ln(Zt+1) is accordingly the
income from the year following the loss. Share of RM is the relative share of refund maximizing tax units.
Source: Own computation based on German Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006.
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Table A.2: Logit model including selection control for diﬀerent criteria of refund
maximization
I II III IV
No 200 Euro Loss Tax-Refund
Deviation Deviation weighted weighted
allowed Deviation(5%) Deviation(2%)
∆τ 3.051*** 2.905*** 2.767*** 2.607***
(0.202) (0.196) (0.195) (0.189)
∆τ2 -3.744*** -4.103*** -3.418*** -3.529***
(0.449) (0.432) (0.441) (0.422)
ln(Zt−1) -0.029*** -0.025*** 0.018** 0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
ln(Zt+1) 0.099*** 0.061*** 0.091*** 0.074***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
ln(loss) 0.171*** -0.109*** -0.103 *** -0.194***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.030)
ln(loss)2 -0.010*** 0.004* 0.001 0.006***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
D tax consultant 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.008
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
D business -0.015 -0.029 -0.048** -0.043**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
D business, high 0.000 0.018 0.030* 0.041**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
D rent 0.015 0.017 0.008 0.010***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
D rent, high -0.018 0.001 -0.003 0.007
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
D year -0.037*** -0.016 -0.018 -0.012
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
D prior losses -0.082*** -0.080*** -0.070*** -0.069***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
λ 0.108*** 0.138*** 0.176*** 0.174***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
N1 8831 8831 8831 8831
N2 1849155 1849155 1849155 1849155
Share of RM .592 .668 .707 .740
Notes: Regressions also include a constant, a marriage dummy and a dummy for losses bigger than income
from adjacent years. Asterisks denote the respective signiﬁcance level at 95% (*), 99% (**), and 99.9% (***).
log(Zt−1) is the logarithm of the total income from the year prior to the loss, log(Zt+1) is accordingly the
income from the year following the loss. λ denotes the inverse Mills ratio from Heckmans sample selection
model. N1 is the number of observations used in the second stage of the model, N2 the number of observations
that are not included in the second stage of the model but in the ﬁrst stage of the Heckman model. Share of
RM is the relative share of refund maximizing tax units.
Source: Own computation based on German Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006.
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7.4 Results from the linear probability model
Table A.3: Probit model including selection control for diﬀerent criteria of refund
maximization
I II III IV
No 200 Euro Loss Tax-Refund
Deviation Deviation weighted weighted
allowed Deviation(5%) Deviation(2%)
∆τ 3.349*** 3.051*** 2.971*** 2.639***
(0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19)
∆τ2 -4.489*** -4.428*** -4.046*** -3.719***
(0.45) (0.43) (0.42) (0.40)
ln(Zt−1) -0.019** -0.021** 0.022*** 0.010
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln(Zt+1) 0.091*** 0.051*** 0.080*** 0.062***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln(loss) 0.173*** -0.054* -0.008 -0.037
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
ln(loss)2 -0.010*** 0.001 -0.003* -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
D tax consultant 0.004 -0.000 0.003 0.006
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
D business -0.014 -0.024 -0.038** -0.026
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
D business, high 0.001 0.014 0.023 0.029*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
D rent 0.014 0.014 0.006 0.008
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
D rent, high -0.016 -0.004 -0.011 -0.005
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
D year -0.040*** -0.016 -0.017 -0.010
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
D prior losses -0.082*** -0.075*** -0.062*** -0.058***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
λ 0.105*** 0.112*** 0.139*** 0.125***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
N1 8831 8831 8831 8831
N2 1849155 1849155 1849155 1849155
Share of RM .592 .668 .707 .740
Notes: Regressions also include a constant, a marriage dummy and a dummy for losses bigger than income
from adjacent years. Asterisks denote the respective signiﬁcance level at 95% (*), 99% (**), and 99.9% (***).
log(Zt−1) is the logarithm of the total income from the year prior to the loss, log(Zt+1) is accordingly the
income from the year following the loss. λ denotes the inverse Mills ratio from Heckmans sample selection
model. N1 is the number of observations used in the linear probability model, N2 the number of observations
that are not included in the linear probability model but in the ﬁrst stage of the Heckman model. Share of
RM is the relative share of refund maximizing tax units.
Source: Own computation based on German Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006.
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Results for the Probit model are very similar to the results from the linear prob-
ability model in Table A.3. A 10 percent tax rate diﬀerence for the benchmark
speciﬁcation for the linear probability model increases the probability of refund
maximization by 29 percentage points. Allowing for minor deviations from refund
maximization delivered for the 10 percent tax rate diﬀerence eﬀects of 26.1 in col-
umn II, 25.7 in column III and 22.7 in column IV. These eﬀects are slightly higher
than the marginal eﬀects from the Probit model which estimates from a 10 percent
tax rate diﬀerence an increase in the probability of refund maximization by 27.1
percentage points in the benchmark speciﬁcation in column I, by 25.1 in column II,
by 24.5 in column III and by 22.5 in column IV.
Table A.4: Dependent variables and covariates
Variable Description Coding/construction
y Tax refund maximization variable Dummy (1=yes; 0=else)
∆τ Diﬀerence between ﬁrst loss Euro tax rates Absolute value of
in prior or following year diﬀerence
Variables included in Xi
log(Zt−1) Taxable income of year prior to the loss Log total income
log(Zt+1) Taxable income of year following the loss Log total income
log of loss Amount of loss in absolute value Log of the loss
Variables included in Zi
D tax consult. Taxpayer has expenses for tax consultant Dummy (1=yes; 0=else)
D business, high Taxpayer has loss from business Dummy (1=yes; 0=else)
more than -10000
D rent Taxpayer has loss from rent and lease Dummy (1=yes; 0=else)
up till -10000
D rent, high Taxpayer has loss from rent and lease Dummy (1=yes; 0=else)
more than -10000
D business Taxpayer has loss from business Dummy (1=yes; 0=else)
up till -10000
D year Year of the loss Dummy (1=2005; 0=2004)
D prior losses Taxpayer had losses in earlier years Dummy (1=yes; 0=else)
of the panel
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